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INTRODUCTION

Intercollegiate athletics-specifically FBS1 football and Division I

basketball-has become a multi-billion dollar industry. Television
networks pay over $1.2 billion a year just to televise college football and
basketball playoff games. 2 National Collegiate Athletic Association

(NCAA) bylaws prohibit players from receiving any portion of the
revenue produced by the televised games. 3 As a result, the majority of the
*

J.D. 2016, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. 2013, Wesleyan

University.
1. Division I football is divided into two subdivisions: the Football Bowl Subdivision
(FBS) and the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS). Because FBS schools are able to offer
more football scholarships than FCS schools, the level of football competition within FBS is
higher than within FCS. Currently, about 120 schools compete in FBS.
2. See Jerry Hinnen, ESPN Reaches 12 year Deal to Air College FootballPlayoffs, CBS
SPORTS (Nov. 21, 2012, 2:03 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-collegefootball/21083689/espn-reaches-12year-deal-to-air-college-football-playoffs; Richard Sandomir
& Pete Thamel, TVDeal Pushes N.C.A.A. Closer to 68-Team Tournament, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 22,
20 10), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/sports/ncaabasketball/ 23ncaa.html?_r=0.
3 See 2015-2016 NCAA Division I Manual § 12 (2015) [hereinafter NCAA Division I Manual],
available at https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4388-2015-2016-ncaa-division-i-manual-augu
st-version-available-august-2015.aspx.
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revenue goes to the NCAA, conferences, schools, and coaches. During
the 2014 fiscal year, the NCAA made $982 million in total revenue. 3 The
Southeastern Conference made over $450 million.4 The University of
Oregon's athletic department brings in more money each year than most
NBA teams. 5 There are 34 FBS football coaches currently that make at
least $3 million a year and 71 FBS football coaches that make over a
6
million.
The majority of FBS football and Division I basketball players do
receive valuable athletic scholarships that cannot exceed the total cost of
attendance at their respective schools. 7 However, recent studies have
concluded that scholarships are likely insufficient considering the value
of these players to their schools and the NCAA. In America's 4 largest
professional sports leagues, teams spend approximately 50% of their
revenue to pay their players. 8 Colleges, meanwhile, spend approximately
9
20% of their revenue on player's scholarships.
Furthermore, these athletic scholarships become less valuable when
studies show that these players likely do not have time to study for class.
FBS football players, on average, spend 43 hours per week on athletic
activities during the season. 10 If these players were hourly employees,
schools would be required to pay them overtime. 1 Of the FBS football
players, 70% said they spend as much or more time on athletic activities
12
during the off-season than in-season.
In response to these apparent inequities, there have been numerous
lawsuits filed against the NCAA. Many of these lawsuits alleged that the
NCAA violated Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
3. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY
(Mar. 11, 2015, 4:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaafinancial-statement-2014-1-billion-revenue/70161386/.
4. 2014-15 SEC Revenue Distribution, SEC SPORTS (May 29, 2015), http://www.sec

sports.com/article/12975224/2014-15-sec-revenue-distribution.
5. See NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2016); The Business of Basketball, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/nbavaluations/list/#tab:overall (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
6. See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Salaries, NCAAF Coaches, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ncaaf/coach/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
7. See NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 3, § 2.13.
8. James Monks, Revenue Shares and Monopsonistic Behavior in Intercollegiate
Athletics 13 (Cornell Higher Educ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 155, 2013), available at
https:// www.ilr.cornell.edu/sites/ilr.cornell.edu/files/WP 155.pdf.

9. Id.
10. See Division I Results from the NCAA GOALS Study on the Student-Athlete
Experience, FARA Annual Meeting and Symposium 17 (2011) [hereinafter NCAA GOALS
Study], available at https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DIGOALSFARAfinal_.pdf.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012).
12. See NCAA GOALS Study, supra note 10, at 21.
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conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce."' 13 This note first examines
the seminal cases discussing the relationship between the NCAA and the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Next, it provides a thorough analysis of the
recent, high profile decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
o 'Bannon v. NCAA. 14 Finally, in light of the O 'Bannon decision, the note
discusses the current state of antitrust jurisprudence concerning
intercollegiate athletics.

H.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

NCAA AND THE SHERMAN

ANTITRUST ACT

In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court, in NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Oklahoma, decided the seminal case on the interaction between the
NCAA and the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 The alleged restraint was a TV
plan negotiated by the NCAA, ABC, and CBS. 1 6 In the plan, the NCAA
granted ABC and CBS the exclusive right to telecast fourteen college
football games annually over the next four years. 7 Depending on whether
the game was national or regional in scope, an NCAA representative
would set a recommended fee for the TV rights that the networks would
offer the competing schools.' 8 The schools could not negotiate with ABC
or CBS and could not threaten to give TV rights to competing networks,
such as NBC. 19 2 0The schools could only accept or decline the
recommended fee.
Notably, the recommended fee did not change, regardless of the
expected number of viewers. 21 The plan also required that all eighty two
member schools have at least two appearances over the course of two
22
years and no school was allowed to appear on TV more than six times.
The University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia alleged that the
TV plan unreasonably restrained trade and violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.23 After a full trial, the Federal District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma agreed with Oklahoma and Georgia
and found that the TV plan enacted by the NCAA violated Section 1 of

13.

15 U.S.C.A. § I(West 2004).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 92.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93 n.11.

20.

Id.

21.
22.
23.

Id. at93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 88.
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the Sherman Act.24 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that NCAA's TV plan constituted
per se illegal price fixing and
25
affirmed the district court's holding.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not apply the per se rule to the
TV plan, the Court affirmed the decision by the court of appeals because
the TV plan curtailed output and fixed prices.26 First, the court explained
why rule of reason analysis should apply to the NCAA's TV plan instead
of per se analysis.27 The Court noted that the TV plan constituted
horizontal restraints that are typically condemned as per se illegal.28 The
Court explained, however, that per se analysis was not appropriate here
because the NCAA is "an industry in which horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all."29 In other
words, substantially less people would watch college football and
aggregate output would be decreased if schools were 30allowed to play by
their own rules or if athletes lost their amateur status.
After determining that rule of reason analysis should be employed, the
31
Court found that the TV plan produced three anticompetitive effects.
First, the Court reasoned that the arrangement reduced output because if
there was no TV plan, schools would be free to sell TV rights to all
networks and more college football games would be televised.32 Second,
the Court found that, because the NCAA fixed the price, the price
networks paid was completely unresponsive to consumer demand and did
not reflect the price that would prevail if schools were allowed to
negotiate with the networks on their own. 33 Third, the Court reasoned that
the arrangement precluded other networks from entering the market for
televised college football games and therefore restrained competition.34
The NCAA argued, however, that its TV plan could not have
significant anticompetitive effects because it did not possess market
power over televised college football. 35 The Court rejected this argument
and held that the NCAA did have market power because college football
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at

95-96.
97-98.
120.
99-104.

28. Id. at 100-01. Perse analysis is typically appropriate when there is a naked restraint on
output or price. Here, the TV plan restricted output by placing a ceiling on the number of televised
games and fixed price by precluding negotiation. Id.
29. Id.at 101.
30. Id.at 101-03.
31. Id.at 104.
32. Id.at 105.

33. Id.at 106-07. Notably, because the purpose of the Sherman Act was to enhance
consumer welfare, the Court found this anticompetitive effect to be the most egregious. Id.
34.

Id. at 108.

35.

Id. at 109.
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broadcasts are a unique product that attracts a unique audience.3 6 In other
words, there are no other products that act as a reasonable substitute for
televised college football games.37 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
proof of market power is not necessary when there is a naked restraint on
price and output and there is a clear anticompetitive impact.38
The NCAA provided three procompetitive justifications for the TV
plan: (1) it is a joint venture that assists in the marketing of broadcast
rights; (2) it protects live attendance; and (3) it increases consumer
interest by maintaining competitive balance. 39 The Court found each
justification to be unpersuasive. 40 First, the Court explained that the
NCAA mistakenly relies on BroadcastMusic v. Columbia Broadcasting
System for its first justification because in Broadcast Music the court
upheld a joint selling arrangement for broadcast rights because it
enhanced the total volume of music sold.4 1 The restraint in the instant
case, however, places a limit on aggregate output, and evidence showed
that there would be more televised college football games if there was not
a TV plan.42 Furthermore, the Court explained that the instant case was
distinguishable from BroadcastMusic because each school is still left to
individually decide (at a fixed price) whether to enter into agreements
with the networks and43the NCAA does not act as a selling agent for any
school or conference.

Second, the Court addressed the NCAA's justification that the TV
plan was necessary so that live attendance at non-televised games would
not be negatively impacted. 4 The Court quickly rejected this argument
because, under the current plan, games are televised during all hours of
college football, which shows that the NCAA was not overly concerned
with gate attendance. 45 Additionally, the Court reasoned that a restraint
is not permissible simply because it protects one product (ticket sales)
from competition from another product (televised games). 46 The Court
based on the
stated that "the Rule of Reason does not support a defense
47
unreasonable."
is
itself
assumption that competition
Finally, the Court addressed NCAA's third justification: the TV plan

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 111-12.
Id.
Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 113-20.
Id.
Id. at 113-14; Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Regents, 468 U.S. at 113-14
Id.; Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 1.
Regents, 468 U.S. at 115.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117.
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48
increases consumer interest by maintaining competitive balance.
Notably, the Court first reasoned that most rules enacted by the NCAA
are justifiable and procompetitive because they maintain competitive
balance among schools, which enhances consumer appeal. 49 The Court
listed three types of rules that the Court would assume were
procompetitive because they maintain competitive balance: "[1] rules
defining the conditions of the contest, [2] the eligibility of participants,
or [3] the manner in which members of a joint enterprise shall share the
responsibilities and the benefits of the total venture." 5 The Court
reasoned, however, that the NCAA rules in this TV plan did not maintain
competitive balance because there is no evidence these restrictions
produce "any greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than
would a restriction on alumni donations, tuition rates, or any other
revenue-producing activity."'" Most importantly, the Court reasoned that
if the NCAA's argument here was accurate, there would be a decrease in
consumer consumption if the restrictions in the TV plan were removed.52
The NCAA's argument therefore failed when, according to the Court,
evidence clearly showed that there would be an increase in televised
college football games if these restrictions were lifted.53
Fourteen years after Regents, in Law v. NCAA, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed an NCAA bylaw that capped
salaries for entry-level NCAA division one-basketball coaches. 54 During
the 1980s, it became difficult for schools to control costs associated with
their athletic programs, especially in light of Title TX, which mandated
that schools support women's athletic programs. 55 The NCAA identified
that part of the problem was that many division one basketball schools
employed part-time assistant basketball coaches and paid them $60,000
or $70,000 a year, even though the NCAA expressly capped part-time
coaches' salaries at the cost of an education (grant-in-aid). 56 Division Ibasketball schools circumvented this policy by employing the coaches in
lucrative summer basketball camps run at the school and by employing
them in the physical education department.57
After establishing a committee to address the increasing costs, the
NCAA enacted bylaw 11.6.4 that limited division one basketball
48.

Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 119. Also, the Court noted that other NCAA sports have maintained competitive
balance without any restrictive TV plan. Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 119-20.
Id.
See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1012-13.
Id. at 1013.

57. Id.
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coaching staffs to one head coach, two assistant coaches, and one
"restrict-earnings coach" (REC). 58 The NCAA also enacted bylaw
11.02.3 restricting compensation for REC's to 16,000 annually, which
the NCAA said approximated the average cost of tuition at out-of-state
and private graduate schools.5 9 The plaintiffs, REC division one
basketball coaches for the 1992-93 academic year, challenged the NCAA
bylaw limiting their compensation under section one of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.6° The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
summary judgment in favor of the REC's and issued a permanent
injunction prohibiting
the NCAA from enforcing any salary limitations
61
against the REC's.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's permanent
injunction because the NCAA failed to show that there were
procompetitive justifications for the salary cap. 62 Adhering to Regents,
the court first explained that, although this case involves clear horizontal
price fixing, it is appropriate to apply rule of reason analysis because
college basketball would not exist without certain horizontal restraints.63
The court broadly interpreted Regents and noted that all horizontal
agreements among NCAA schools, even agreements as egregious as price
fixing, should be evaluated under the rule of reason. 64 After determining
that rule of reason analysis was appropriate, the court explained the
burden shifting standard it used to evaluate the plaintiffs' claims: (1)
plaintiffs have burden to show that agreement had substantially adverse
effect on competition; (2) if plaintiffs satisfy the first prong, then
defendant has burden to prove that there are procompetitive justifications
for the agreement; and (3) if defendant satisfies the second prong, then
plaintiffs have burden to prove that agreement is not reasonably necessary
to its purported objectives or that those
objectives can be achieved in a
65
substantially less restrictive manner.
According to the court, to satisfy the first prong of the burden shifting
standard, the REC's must either prove that NCAA possess the requisite
market power within a defined market or prove that agreement had actual
anticompetitive effects. 66 The court found that the NCAA did not possess
market power over the relevant market because REC's only made up 8%
of the men's basketball coaching market.67 However, the plaintiffs
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1014.
1015.
1024.
1016-19.
1019.
1019-20.
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satisfied the first prong of the burden shifting standard because (1) the
agreement fixed prices; (2) the agreement was effective at reducing
REC's salaries; and (3) the agreement was more favorable to the NCAA
schools than what would 68have otherwise occurred under the operation of
unfettered market forces.
Because the REC's satisfied the first prong of the burden shifting
standard, the NCAA was required to prove that there were procompetitive
justifications for the restraint. 69 The NCAA offered three justifications
and the court found each one to be unpersuasive. 70 First, the NCAA
argued that the cap on REC's compensation would allow younger, less
experienced coaches enter division one basketball coaching. 71 In other
words, it would help establish an entry-level position in the division one
basketball coaching market. The court explained that it would not even
consider this argument because, although enticing younger, lessexperienced coaches to become REC's might be of social value, it has no
impact on competition and is therefore immaterial to antitrust analysis.72
Second, the NCAA argued that the agreement would cut costs and,
considering the deficits many schools face, cutting costs was necessary
to save intercollegiate athletics. 73 The court quickly dismissed this
argument as not a valid procompetitive justification because, if it were,
any group of competing buyers could justify setting maximum prices
because it cut costs. 74 Furthermore, the court was not convinced that the

REC rule was necessary to save intercollegiate sports because the NCAA
presents no evidence that the rule would be successful in reducing
deficits.75 Moreover, the REC rule does not preclude schools from using
the money saved on compensating REC's and spending it on other
aspects of the basketball program, such as recruiting, equipment,
facilities, and full-time coaches' salaries.76
68. Id. at 1020-21. Notably, the court also distinguished the instant case from Hennessey
v. NCAA, which upheld an NCAA bylaw limiting the number of assistant coaches schools could
employ. Id. at 1021; Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). The court did not find
Hennessey persuasive because Hennessey addressed a restriction on number of coaches, while the
instant case addressed a restriction on salary. Law, 134 F.3d at 1021; see Hennessey, 564 F.2d at
1151. Moreover, the court reasoned that Hennessey predated Regents, which demanded that courts
take a less deferential approach to NCAA restraints. Law, 134 F.3d at 1021; NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1136.
69. Law, 134 F.3d at 1021.
70. Id. at 1021-24.
71. Id. at 1021.
72. Id. at 1021-22.
73. Id. at 1022-23.
74. Id. The court did provide a list of valid procompetitive justifications: (1) increasing
output, (2) creating operating efficiencies, (3) making a new product available, (4) enhancing
product or service quality, and (5) widening consumer choice. Id. at 1023.
75. Id.

76. Id.
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Third, the NCAA argued that the agreement increased competitive
balance by likely barring wealthier teams from hiring four experienced
coaches instead of three.7 7 The court dismissed this argument because the
bylaw did not prohibit the hiring of an experienced REC.78 In fact, there's
evidence that many schools hired experienced coaches as REC's and
there's no evidence that the salary limitations would be effective at
equalizing the experience level of REC's. 7 9 Because the NCAA's
proffered justifications failed to satisfy the second prong of the burden
shifting analysis, the court did not address the third prong and affirmed
summary judgment against the NCAA. 8°
In 2012, inAgnew v. NCAA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld NCAA bylaws that prohibited multi-year scholarships and
capped the number of scholarships schools could offer. 81 The plaintiffs
were two top high school football players who earned football
scholarships to FBS schools. 82 After suffering career-ending injuries,
however, both of their schools refused to renew their scholarships for the
upcoming year. 83 The plaintiffs sued the NCAA under Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that if these two bylaws did not exist,
then schools would not only offer more scholarships, but they would also
offer multi-year scholarships. 84 More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that the bylaws restricted output by capping the number of scholarships
and the bylaws fixed the prices of scholarships at the cost of one year of
education and were therefore an unreasonable restraint on trade in the
labor market for student athletes. 85 The NCAA moved to dismiss the
86
case.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted
the NCAA's motion to dismiss with prejudice because the plaintiffs failed
to identify a cognizable market in which trade was improperly
restrained. 87 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding
that, although the district court was incorrect to state that plaintiffs could
not have alleged a market cognizable under the Sherman Act, the district
court was correct that the plaintiffs did not identify the cognizable market
77. Id. at 1023-24.
78. Id. at 1022.
79. Id. Also, in a footnote, the court suggests that, without the salary restrictions on REC's,
less prominent schools could attract more experienced schools by offering a higher salary, thereby
reducing coaching inequity in college basketball. Id. at 1024 n.15.
80. Id.
81. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
82. Id. at 332.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 332-33.
85.

Id. at 333.

86.
87.

Id.
Id.
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88
on which bylaws had an anticompetitive effect.
In its lengthy opinion, the court first explained that a quick-look
analysis, instead of per se or rule of reason analysis, was the appropriate
framework to apply in the instant case. 89 Pursuant to quick-look analysis,
the court addressed NCAA's argument that the district court's dismissal
should be affirmed because the challenged bylaws were presumptively
procompetitive. 90 According to the court, if the challenged bylaws are
presumptively procompetitive, then the court is relieved from conducting
a full rule of reason analysis and the case should be dismissed. 9' If the
bylaws are not presumptively procompetitive, then a full rule of reason
analysis is required
to determine whether the bylaws are, in fact,
92

procompetitive.

Based on Regents, the court reasoned that NCAA bylaws are
presumptively procompetitive when the purpose of the bylaw is "clearly
meant to help maintain the 'revered tradition of amateurism in college
93
sports' or the 'preservation of the student-athlete in higher education."'
Applying this test to the challenged bylaws in the instant case, the court
94
held that the challenged bylaws were not presumptively procompetitive.
The court reasoned that a one-year limit to scholarships was not assisting
in preserving amateurism because a four-year scholarship football player95
is just as much of an amateur as a one-year scholarship football player.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that placing a cap on scholarships
available per team is likely there only to
control costs and does not
96
necessarily decrease competitive balance.
In addition to reasoning that the challenged bylaws here were not
presumptively procompetitive, the court also addressed the central issue
on appeal: whether the plaintiffs could have ever identified a cognizable
market (implicating the Sherman Act) on which the bylaws had an
anticompetitive effect. 97 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district
court and held that plaintiffs could have identified a cognizable market

88. Id. at 345. The court explained that the quick-look analysis was appropriate because
the NCAA is an industry where horizontal restraints are essential, but these bylaws are facially
anticompetitive considering they restrict output (capping the number of scholarships available)
and fix price (capping the price the schools must pay for student-athletes at one year). Id. at 33637.
89. Id. at 335.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 342-43.
92. Id. at 343.
93. Id. at 342.
94. Id. at 343-44.
95. Id. at 344.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 337-38.
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under the Sherman act. 98 The court explained that there is undoubtedly a
market at play here for these student athletes and the only question is
whether the market is commercial and therefore cognizable under the
Sherman Act. 99 The NCAA argued that these bylaws were not
implicating a commercial interest because, in Smith v. NCAA, the Third
Circuit found that NCAA bylaws prohibiting graduate students from
playing sports was an eligibility rule and not related to NCAA's
commercial interests. 100 However, considering intercollegiate sports has
become a multibillion-dollar industry, the court was unconvinced by
NCAA's proffered case law and held that "transactions between NCAA
schools and student athletes are, to some degree, commercial in
nature." 10 1 The court noted that "[n]o knowledgeable observer could
earnestly assert that big-time college football programs competing for
not anticipate
highly sought-after high school football players do
10 2
economic gain from a successful recruiting program."'
Although the court found that the market between NCAA and student
athletes is, to some degree, commercial, the court explained that the
plaintiffs are still required to provide the "rough contours of the relevant
commercial market" in their complaint.'03 The plaintiffs argued that they
identified two markets in their complaint: (1) market for bachelor's
degrees and (2) market for student-athlete labor. 10 4 First, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs not only failed to identify the market for
bachelor's degrees in their complaint, but also that, even if they did, such
a market is likely not cognizable under the Sherman Act. 10 5 Second,
although the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to identify the
market for student-athlete labor in their complaint, the court held that
such a market is cognizable under the Sherman Act.10 6 The court reasoned
that labor markets for student athletes are cognizable under the Sherman
Act and the market for scholarship athletes is a labor market for two
reasons: (1) schools would engage in fierce price competition for
98. Id. at 345.
99. Id. at 338.
100. Id. at 339; Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir.1998). The NCAA also relied on
Banks v. NCAA, which upheld NCAA bylaws prohibiting students that had entered a professional
draft or hired an agent from playing sports were eligibility rules and not related the NCAA's
commercial interests. Id. at 340; Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
101. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012).
102. Id. at 340.
103. See id. at 345.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 345-46. The court reasoned that it was likely not cognizable under the
Sherman Act because, unlike the market for educational services, bachelor's degrees are not
purchased out-right, meaning that prospective students do not purchase the right to a bachelor's
degree, but rather the opportunity to earn one. Id. at 346.
106. Id. 346-47.
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scholarship athletes if it were not for other NCAA bylaws, and (2) schools
already compete for scholarship athletes through attractive in-kind
benefits, such as top coaches, facilities, and academic programs. 10 7
IH.

O'BANNON v.NCAA, 802 F.3D 1049 (9TH CIR. 2015)
A. The Opinion by the DistrictCourtfor the Northern
Districtof California

Plaintiffs, twenty current and former FBS football or Division I
basketball players, alleged that the NCAA restrained trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in the following two markets:
(1) college education market and (2) group licensing market. l08 The court
held that the two markets were cognizable and that the NCAA possessed
market power in each one. 109 The court reasoned that, in the college
education market, FBS football and Division I basketball schools were
the only suppliers of athletic scholarships to the finest high school
football and basketball players in the country." 0 For the group licensing
market, the court concluded that, absent NCAA restrictions, plaintiffs
could create and sell valuable group licenses for the right to use their
names, images, likenesses (NIL) in live football and basketball games,
videogames, re-broadcasts, advertisements, and archival footage."ll
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' argument that the following
two sets of NCAA bylaws restrained trade in the markets identified
above: (1) the bylaws capping student-athlete scholarships at the full cost
107. See id.
108. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
109. See id. at 965-71.
110. See id. at 967-68. Dr. Noll also testified that elite football and basketball recruits could
be characterized as sellers and the schools could be characterized as buyers. Id. at 973. In such a
market, "FBS football and Division I basketball schools are buyers seeking to acquire recruits'
athletic services and licensing rights, paying for them with full grants-in-aid but no more." Id. In
that scenario, the court concluded that, instead of having a sellers' cartel, the NCAA has a buyers'
cartel. Id.
111. Id. at 968-73. For live football and basketball games, the court concluded that, absent
NCAA restrictions, plaintiffs could create and sell group licenses of NIL's to TV networks
because TV networks already purchase the right to use NIL's of student athletes from schools and
conferences. Id. at 968-69. For videogames, the court also found that, absent NCAA restrictions,
plaintiffs could create and sell group licenses of NIL's to videogame developers because the VicePresident of EA Sports, Joel Linzer, testified that, absent NCAA restrictions, the company would
acquire group licenses of NIL's from NCAA basketball and football players, just like they do with
NFL and NBA players. Id. at 970. For re-broadcasts, advertisements, and archival footage, the
court also reasoned that, absent NCAA restrictions, plaintiffs could create and sell group licenses
of NIL's for re-broadcasts, advertisements, and archival footage because TV networks already
purchase these group licenses from the schools and conferences. Id. at 970-71.
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of attendance, and (2) the bylaws prohibiting student athletes from
receiving outside compensation based on their athletic ability. 112 The
court agreed with the plaintiffs, reasoning that, absent NCAA restrictions,
schools would offer student-athletes compensation that exceeded the cost
because of the fierce competition to acquire the best
of attendance
13
recruits.1
Having found that the bylaws did restrain competition by fixing
prices, the court then addressed the NCAA's four procompetitive
justifications: (1) bylaws preserve amateurism and increase consumer
demand; (2) bylaws increase or maintain competitive balance; (3) bylaws
help in the integration of academics and athletics; and (4) bylaws increase
output of FBS football and Division I basketball games.1 14 The court held
that the first and third justifications were marginally procompetitive, but
the second and fourth were not.115 The court first found the NCAA's nopay policy did marginally increase consumer demand. 116 The court noted,
however, that although surveys showed that consumers did not want
college athletes to be paid, the surveys were flawed because they asked
consumers about paying athletes twenty to fifty thousand a year and did
17
not ask consumers about any of the plaintiffs proposed alternatives."
Moreover, evidence showed that, despite surveys showing the opposite,
Major League Baseball increased in popularity after player salaries were
in popularity after professional
increased, and the Olympics increased
118
athletes were allowed to compete.
Next, the court held that the no-pay policy did not increase or maintain
competitive balance because, instead of using their massive revenues on
paying students, high-revenue schools simply used the money on premier
coaching, extravagant facilities, and relentless recruiting. 119 The NCAA
could not legitimately argue that the purpose of the no-pay policy was to
ensure competitive balance because the NCAA did nothing to regulate
the amount of money schools spent on other aspects of their athletic
programs. 2 ° Addressing the NCAA's third justification, the court held
that the no-pay policy did, in fact, marginally improve the educational
services offered to student athletes. 121 Finally, the court reasoned that the
112.

See id. at 971-72.

113. See id. at 972-73.
114. Id. at 973.
115. Id.at 1007.
116. Id.at 1001.
117. See id. at 975-76, 1000.
118. Seeid. at 976-77, 1000-01.
119. Id. at 1001-02.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 1003. However, the court did note that the educational benefits student-athletes
receive often come from the amenities schools provide on their own accord. Id. Moreover, the
time demands associated with playing football and basketball preclude many student athletes from

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAWAND PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 27

existing no-pay policy did not increase the number of FBS football and
Division I basketball games because there's no evidence that schools,
specifically low-revenue schools, choose to compete in Division I
22
collegiate athletics because of the no-pay policy. 1
Nonetheless, because the NCAA proved that its no-pay policy served
two procompetitive purposes, the court shifted the burden on the
plaintiffs to prove a substantially less restrictive alternative to the existing
no-pay policy. The court approved two of the plaintiffs' proposed
alternatives: (1) NCAA could permit schools to compensate students up
to the full cost of attendance, 123 and (2) NCAA could permit schools to
hold equal shares of NIL licensing revenue in trust for their studentathletes until graduation. 124 The court reasoned that both alternatives
were substantially less restrictive than the existing no-pay policy because
if schools were allowed to offer more financial aid or deferred
compensation, then there would be an increase in price competition for
FBS football and Division I basketball players. 12 5 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that both alternatives, if implemented, would not decrease
consumer demand and would not decrease the student-athlete's
educational opportunities. 126 As a result, the district court enjoined the
NCAA from (1) prohibiting schools from capping financial aid
compensation below the full cost of attendance and (2) prohibiting
schools from offering their FBS football and Division I basketball players
127
up to $5000 per year in deferred compensation.
B. The Opinion by the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling
that, under the rule of reason, the NCAA's existing no-pay policy violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' 2 8 The court also agreed with the
district court that permitting schools to offer scholarships up to the full
excelling in school. See id.
122. See id. at 1004.
123. Id. at 1005. In August 2014, the NCAA announced it would allow member schools to

increase scholarships up to the fill cost of attendance. The five largest athletic conferences in
collegiate athletics voted in January 2015 to increase the scholarship cap at the full cost of
attendance. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2015).
124. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1005-07.
125. Id. at 982-83.

126. Id. at 982-84.
127.

Id. at 1007-08. The court provided the following justification for five thousand dollar

figure: "The NCAA's witnesses stated that their concerns about student-athlete compensation
would be minimized or negated if compensation was capped at a few thousand dollars per year.
This is also comparable to the amount of money that the NCAA permits student-athletes to receive
ifthey qualify for a Pell grant and the amount that tennis players may receive prior to enrollment."
Id. at 1008.
128.

O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
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29
cost of attendance would be a substantially less restrictive alternative. 1
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on deferred
compensation and held that such an alternative would not be as effective
in preserving amateurism and increasing consumer demand as the
existing no-pay policy. 130 In short, the court affirmed the district court's
injunction, but vacated the portion that required the NCAA to allow
schools to provide deferred compensation.' 3
The court concluded that the challenged NCAA bylaws were subject
to the Sherman Antitrust Act for three reasons. First, pursuant to Regents,
the court reasoned that, although the challenged bylaws help preserve
amateurism, a full rule of reason analysis is still necessary to determine
whether the bylaws are procompetitive and whether there are
substantially less restrictive alternatives. 32 Notably, the court found the
"procompetitive presumption" analysis in Agnew to be flawed and held
that all allegedly anticompetitive NCAA bylaws-even the ones that help
preserve amateurism-are subject to antitrust scrutiny and the full rule of
reason analysis. 133 Second, the court reasoned that the challenged bylaws
regulate commercial activity because schools and athletes undoubtedly
anticipate economic gain when schools provide valuable scholarships to
players in return for their labor and the right to use their NIL's. 13 4 Third,
the court reasoned that plaintiffs had standing under the Sherman Act
antitrust injury when they were foreclosed from the
because they suffered
135
videogame market.
The court then applied the three-part burden-shifting standard to the
instant case. 136 First, the court held that plaintiffs satisfied the initial
burden of proving that the challenged bylaws produce an anticompetitive
effect because the existing no-pay policy fixed the price of a studentathlete's labor and NIL at the cost of a grant-in-aid. 137 Second, the court
agreed with the district court that the NCAA satisfied their burden in
showing that the challenged bylaws served procompetitive purposes. The
court reasoned that, although the challenged bylaws do not increase
competitive balance or output, they do increase consumer demand by
marginally improve the educational
preserving amateurism and they 38
opportunities for student-athletes. 1
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1078-79.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1063-64.
Id. at 1064; Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1064-66.
Id. at 1066-67.
Id. at 1070.
Id.

138. Id. at 1072-74. Notably, in its discussion ofNCAA's amateurism justification, the court
reasoned that the opportunity to earn a higher education would still be available to student-athletes
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To satisfy the third step in the burden shifting standard, the court
explained that, because the NCAA must have "ample latitude" to
superintend college athletics, the plaintiffs' alternative must not only be
less restrictive, but it must also be "virtually as effective" in serving the
procompetitive purposes of the existing no-pay policy. 139 Furthermore, in
response to fears that upholding the injunction would open the floodgates
to antitrust lawsuits demanding that courts make marginal adjustments to
broadly reasonable and procompetitive market restraints, the court opined
that such restraints should only be invalidated when they are patently and
inexplicably stricter than is necessary to accomplish all of its
procompetitive objectives.140 After explaining this high burden, the court
addressed the plaintiffs' two proposals: (1) allowing schools to provide
scholarships to their student athletes that cover the full cost of attendance,
and (2) allowing schools to provide student-athletes small amounts of
deferred compensation. 41 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' first
proposal was valid because the alternative would not impact a studentathlete's amateur status because the money would only be going to cover
educational costs, and no evidence suggests that consumer
demand or
142
decrease.
would
opportunities
educational
student-athlete
For the plaintiffs' second alternative, however, the court held that the
district court erred in finding that this was a substantially less restrictive
alternative because the alternative would not be "virtually as effective" at
preserving amateurism as the existing no-pay policy.' 43 The court
reasoned that the alternative would not be as effective because "not
144
paying student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs."
Moreover, the court opined that once this line is crossed, it is likely that
FBS football and Division I basketball players will not stop until they
receive the full value of their NIL's. 145 In sum, the court found that the
district court relied on insufficient evidence to make the far-reaching
conclusion that paying student-athletes $5000 in deferred compensation
would be6 as effective in preserving amateurism as the existing no-pay
policy.

14

if they were paid, and that it is immaterial, for antitrust analysis, how long the NCAA has been
committed to its amateurism model. Id. at 1072-73.
139. Id. at 1074.
140. Id. at 1075.
141. Id. at 1074.
142. Id. at 1075.
143. Id. at 1076-77.

144. Id.at 1076 (emphasis in original).
145. Id. at 1078-79.
146. Id. at 1079. Furthermore, the court reasoned that district court incorrectly relied on

consumer surveys that showed that small payments to players would negatively impact consumer
demand less than large payments to players. Id. at 1077-79. The surveys never asked about the

impact on consumer demand if players, instead of only receiving a scholarship, were paid five
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TnE CURRENT STATE OF ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
CONCERNING INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

Based on the above case law, it is evident that courts address five main
issues when they evaluate Sherman Antitrust Act claims against the
NCAA: (1) whether plaintiffs have alleged a cognizable market where
competition has been restrained; (2) whether the court should apply per
se, quick-look rule of reason, or full rule of reason analysis; (3) whether
the plaintiffs can satisfy their initial burden of proving the bylaws have
caused an anticompetitive effect; (4) whether the NCAA can satisfy their
burden of proving that the bylaws serve a procompetitive purpose; and
(5) whether plaintiffs have offered a substantially less restrictive
Part will examine how a court
alternative. In light of O'Bannon, this 147
issue.
each
approach
likely
would
today
In order to survive the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs must identify
the "rough contours of the relevant commercial market" where
competition is restrained in their complaint. 148 Agnew held that the
market for student labor is cognizable under the Sherman Antitrust Act
because schools compete for top student-athletes by offering in-kind
149
benefits and expect economic gain from acquiring student-athletes.
O'Bannon identified two more cognizable markets: (1) the college
education market and (2) the group licensing market. 5 0 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed that both markets were cognizable because student-athlete
scholarships and student-athlete group NIL's have economic value.151
If plaintiffs allege a cognizable market where NCAA bylaws allegedly
restrain competition, courts will then decide whether to apply per se,
quick-look rule of reason, or full rule of reason analysis. It is very unlikely
that a court would ever find an NCAA bylaw to be per se illegal because
horizontal restraints are essential in the collegiate athletic industry. Law
and O 'Bannon held that, based on Regents, all NCAA bylaws--even the
ones that help preserve amateurism-are to be given the full rule of

thousand a year in deferred compensation. Id. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the district
court incorrectly relied on Major League Baseball and the Olympics because those organizations
are simply not comparable to collegiate athletics. Id. Finally, the court reasoned that an offhand
remark on cross examination of the NCAA's expert, Neil Pilson, where he said "I tell you that a
million dollars would trouble me and $5,000 wouldn't, but that's a pretty good range" is simply
not enough to support the conclusion that five thousand in deferred compensation would be as
effective in preserving amateurism as the existing no-pay policy. Id.
147. Id. at 1049.
148. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 345 (7th Cir. 2012).
149. Id. at 346-47.
150. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965-71 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
151. Id.
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reason analysis.1 52 Agnew, however, interpreted Regents differently.153
Agnew explained that a quick-look rule of reason analysis should apply
to NCAA bylaws.' 54 If the bylaws help preserve amateurism, then no full
rule of reason analysis is necessary and the restraint is lawful. 155 If the
bylaws serve
a different purpose, then a full rule of reason analysis is
56
necessary. 1
Once a court determines a full rule of reason analysis is appropriate
for the challenged bylaw, plaintiffs must first prove that the bylaws had
an adverse impact on competition. Pursuant to Law, plaintiffs can satisfy
this burden if they prove that the NCAA has market power or that the
bylaws produce an anticompetitive effect. 157 Law found that the NCAA
did not possess market power because REC's only made up 8% of the
Division I basketball coaching market. 5 8 However, O 'Bannon found that
the NCAA possessed market power over the college education and grouplicensing market because there was no reasonable substitute for the
bundle of goods colleges offer top FBS football and Division I basketball
players. 59 Absent NCAA market power, however, plaintiffs routinely
satisfy this initial burden if they can show that the NCAA bylaws fixed
prices, restricted
output, or caused prices to be unresponsive to consumer
60
demand. 1
If the plaintiffs satisfy their initial burden, the NCAA is then required
to show that the challenged bylaws serve a procompetitive purpose.
Regents reasoned that the following categories of bylaws served a
procompetitive function: (1) bylaws regulating the conditions of the
contest, (2) bylaws regulating the eligibility of participants, or (3) bylaws
regulating the manner in member schools share the responsibilities and
the benefits of the total venture. 16 1 Notably, O'Bannon interpreted
Regents and reasoned that the NCAA bylaws restricting student-athlete
compensation to a grant-in-aid served two procompetitive purposes:
preserving amateurism and increasing student-athlete educational
opportunities. 162 Furthermore, Law provided a list of valid
procompetitive purposes: (1) increasing output, (2) creating operating
efficiencies, (3) making a new product available, (4) enhancing product
152. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1984); Law v. NCAA,
134 F.3d
153.
154.
155.

1010, 1016-19 (10th Cir. 1998); O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063-64.
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 328.
Id. at 342-43.
Id.

156. Id.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
Id.
O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id.; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (10th Cir. 1998).
Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072-74; Regents, 468 U.S. at 85.
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or service quality, and (5) widening consumer choice. 163 However,
cutting costs and establishing an64 entry-level coaching position were not
valid procompetitive purposes.'
If the NCAA proves that the challenged bylaws serve a
procompetitive purpose, the final step is to determine whether plaintiffs
have offered a substantially less restrictive alternative. Because the
NCAA must have "ample latitude" to manage collegiate athletics,
o 'Bannonsignaled that plaintiffs have a heavy burden here.165 O 'Bannon
established that plaintiffs must prove two elements: (1) the existing
restraint is patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary to
accomplish all of its procompetitive objectives, and (2) the alternative is
virtually as effective at serving procompetitive purpose as the existing
restraint. 166 In O'Bannon, the deferred compensation alternative failed
because the plaintiffs presented minimal evidence proving that it would
be as effective at preserving amateurism and consumer appeal as the
existing no-pay policy.' 67 Thus, pursuant to this standard, unless future
plaintiffs can definitively prove that their alternative would not decrease
amateurism and consumer appeal of FBS football and Division I
basketball, plaintiffs will have a difficult time invalidating NCAA's
existing no-pay policy.

163. Law, 134 F.3d at 1023.
164. Id. at 1021-23.
165. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074.
166. Id. at 1074-75.
167. Id. at 1076-77.
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